The Public Sector Right to Strike in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Analysis by Lacampagne, Suzanne C
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 6
5-1-1983
The Public Sector Right to Strike in Canada and the
United States: A Comparative Analysis
Suzanne C. Lacampagne
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons,
Labor Relations Commons, and the Work, Economy and Organizations Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Suzanne C. Lacampagne, The Public Sector Right to Strike in Canada and the United States: A
Comparative Analysis, 6 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 509 (1983), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/
iclr/vol6/iss2/6
The Public Sector Right to Strike in Canada and the 
United States: A Comparative Analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Canadian public employees l have long enjoyed collective bargaining rights 
comparable in all major respects to those enjoyed by private sector employees.2 
The federal Public Service Staff Relations Act,3 enacted in 1967, granted public 
employees4 such bargaining rights as membership in an employee organization,S 
exclusive representation6 by their unions in the collective bargaining process7 
and the choice of one of two methods of dispute resolution following an impasse 
in negotiations.s The Public Service Staff Relations Act allows federal employees 
to strike9 unless their duties are necessary for the safety and security of the 
public. lO As in the private sector, legislation imposes certain obligations on public 
1. "Public employees" will be the term used to designate those who work for the government, 
whether local, regional or federal. "Public employees" are employed in the public sector, as opposed to 
"private employees," who are employed in the private sector. 
2. Arthurs, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service of Canada: Bold Experiment or Act of Folly?, 67 
MICH. L. REv. 971 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Arthurs]. 
3. Public Service Staff Relations Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35 (1970). 
4. The Act covers all employees in the "Public Service" of Canada, either in the central administra-
tion or in one of several autonomous agencies. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 2; Arthurs,supra note 2, at 
978-79. "The Public Service of Canada is roughly analogous to the American Civil Service System." 
Arthurs, supra note 2, at 971 n.1. 
5. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 6. 
6. A bargaining unit which acts as the sole representative of a group of employees enjoys the right of 
"exclusive representation." R. GoRMAN, LABOR LAW 374 (1976). The employer must bargain with this 
bargaining unit only.ld. He may not bargain with individual employees or other bargaining units.ld. 
7. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 40(I)(a)(i). 
8. ld. § 60. The two choices are arbitration or conciliation, discussed in § Ill.C infra. Arbitration is a 
process for resolution of disputes in which the dispute is submitted to a neutral third-party adjudicator. 
In Canada, the Arbitration Tribunal renders an arbitral award which is binding on the parties to a 
dispute. See id. §§ 60( 1), 67, 72. Conciliation, like arbitration, involves a neutral third party responsible 
for helping the parties reach an agreement. The process involves investigation and mediation, and the 
results are non-binding. Id. § 77. In the Canadian federal public sector, conciliation is conducted by a 
conciliation board which investigates and conciliates the dispute. Id. § 78. 
9. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 101. The Public Service Staff Relations Act's definition of strike 
includes a "cessation of work or a refusal to work or to continue to work by employees in combination or 
in concert or in accordance with a common understanding, or a slowdown or other concerted activity on 
the part of employees designed to restrict or limit output." Id. § 2. This definition is almost identical with 
that used in the United States. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 142 
(1976), which includes in its definition "any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees ... 
and any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees." Id. 
10. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. P-35, §§ 79(1), IOI(I)(c). 
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employees and their employers in their negotiations, such as the duty to bargain 
in good faith. 11 
The extensive nature of collective bargaining rights for Canadian public 
employees provides a marked contrast to the more limited rights afforded their 
U.S. counterparts, especially at the federal level. While U.S. federal employees 
may not strike under any circumstances,12 Canadian federal employees may 
strike within statutory limits.13 This Comment examines the right to strike in the 
public sector in Canada, particularly at the federal level, and contrasts the U.S. 
policy of denying this right to federal, and some state, public employees. In 
examining the right to strike in Canada, the author focuses on Canada's Public 
Service Staff Relations Act and discusses the structure which the Act provides 
for resolving public sector labor disputes. The Comment delineates the statutory 
restrictions on the right to strike in Canada and analyzes the Canadian govern-
ment's handling of the postal workers' strike of 1968. In conclusion, the Com-
ment provides a synopsis of the denial of the right to strike in the United States 
and explores the U.S. government's handling of the recent strike by the Profes-
sional Air Traffic Controllers Organization. 
II. BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RiGHTS IN 
CANADA 
Canada has been relatively tolerant of public employee collective bargaining 
rights. 14 Historically, Canadians have not distinguished between the public and 
private sectors in granting collective bargaining rights. 15 When the government 
was considering whether to grant or withhold the right to strike early in this 
century, the determinative factor was not whether employees worked in the 
public or private sector, but whether "the community had either a direct pro-
prietary interest in or a special concern arising out of the essential nature of the 
industries affected."16 In fact, in many provinces a single stuatute often gov-
erned labor relations in both the public and private sectors. 17 At the federal 
level,18 legislation governing labor relations was slower to develop. 
II. !d. §§ 50, 59. 
12. See 5 U .S.c. § 7311 (1975), which prohibits federal public employees from striking. For a quote of 
this statute, see note 211 infra. 
13. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. P-35, § !OJ. Section !OI prohibits strikes by employees: (I) not included in a 
bargaining unit represented by a certified bargaining agent; (2) included in a bargaining unit for which 
the process for resolution of a dispute is by arbitration; or (3) who are designated employees (i.e., those 
whose duties are necessary in the interest of public safety and security. !d. § 79(b». Employees may not 
strike where a collective agreement is in force. [d. § 101(2)(a). 
14. Feuille & Anderson, Public Sector Bargaining: Policy and Practice, 19 INDUS. REL. 309, 316 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Feuille & Anderson]. 
15. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 971-72. 
16. [d. 
17. !d. at 972. 
18. The Canadian federal government is a parliamentary system. The governor general, appointed 
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Initially, public acceptance of public service collective bargaining rights was 
evidenced by both the local and provincial levels of government.19 For example, 
in 1944 the provincial government of Saskatchewan enacted the first Canadian 
legislation granting public employees bargaining rights similar to those enjoyed 
by private employees.2o The newly elected democratic socialist government,21 
which was committed to extending collective bargaining rights in both the public 
and private sectors, passed this legislation. 22 The Saskatchewan statute, pat-
terned after the United States' Wagner Act,23 applied to both public and private 
employment relations. 24 Thus, Saskatchewan discarded the notion that a 
sovereign state should treat its employees differently than private industry 
does. 25 These extensive bargaining rights remained unchanged until 1966, when 
a massive strike threatened the operations of the Saskatchewan Power Corpora-
tion, the publicly owned electrical distribution system. 26 Prior to the strike, 
Saskatchewan had not enacted legislation to maintain even essential services in 
the event of a strike by public employeesP The government reacted to the strike 
by enacting emergency dispute legislation,2ti outlawing all strikes which en-
on the advice of the prime minister, is the representative of the Queen of England. However, the true 
seat of power lies in the elected House of Commons, where the leader of the majority party is 
automatically designated by the governor general to form a cabinet and thus to become prime minister. 
The House may be dissolved and a new election called in the event of legislative defeat or no-confidence 
vote. The governor general appoints the members of the Senate along both geographical and party 
lines. The Senate must also approve all legislation but tends to limit itself to the exercise of a secondary, 
restraining influence. 
Canada is divided geographically into ten provinces and two territories. Provincial governments 
operate much like the federal government. Each province has its own constitution, a lieutenant 
governor appointed by the governor general and a legislative assembly whose principal leader is the 
provincial premier. Municipalities are subject to provincial, rather than federal, authority and are 
governed by elected officials. The Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories are governed by 
appointed commissioners with the assistance of elected or appointed council members. 'Each province 
has its own judicial system, with a right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. POLITICAL 
HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1979, at 97-98 (A. Banks ed. 1979). 
19. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 971-72. 
20. Trade Union Act, 1944 Sask. Stat. (2d Sess.) ch. 69, §§ 2(5)-(6), consolidated in SASK. REv. STAT. 
ch. 287, §§ l(f), 2(e)-(f) (1965). 
21. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 972-73. 
22. Arthurs,Public Interest Labor Disputes in Canada: A Legislative Perspective, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 39,63 
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Public Interest Disputes]. 
23. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The Wagner Act applied to 
private employees only. It granted them the right to organize and bargain collectively.ld. § 157. It did 
not prohibit the right to strike.ld. § 163. See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), which upheld the constitutional validity of the Wagner Act. 
24. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 973. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. The Essential Services Emergency Act 1966, 1966-1967 Sask. Stat. ch. 2 (1966). 
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dangered the public interest.29 Although the government prohibited such strikes 
by public employees, it left other collective bargaining rights intact.3o 
After World War II, the provinces dominated the legislative labor relations 
scene by passing or reviving a number of statutes aimed at limiting or prohibiting 
strikes in essential industries.3! Despite these limitations, the provinces extended 
collective bargaining rights to most provincial civil servants. 32 By the mid-1960's, 
most of the provinces had granted municipal employees collective bargaining 
rights by statute,33 prohibiting strikes only by "essential employees."34 
Quebec first granted collective bargaining rights to unions representing pro-
vincial governmental employees in 1965.35 The provincial government allowed 
its employees to strike unless a strike or threat of a strike would endanger the 
public health or safety or interfere with students' education.36 Employees soon 
took advantage of this new right to strike.37 New Brunswick followed Quebec's 
29. 1966-1967 Sask. Stat. ch. 2, § 10. Following the Saskatchewan Power Corporation strike, the 
government enacted the Essential Services Emergency Act at a special legislative session, to be invoked 
immediately. Framed in terms of general and future application, the Act required employees to end 
their strike and return to work, and threatened to revoke the union's bargaining rights if it continued 
the strike or failed, in the government's opinion, "to do everything reasonable to end the strike." 
1966-1967 Sask. Stat. ch. 2, § 1O(I)(a). In addition, while the statute submitted the dispute to arbitration, 
the validity of the arbitral award was conditional upon the termination of the strike. With the passage of 
this statute, Saskatchewan joined the ranks of those provinces which made special legislative provision to 
ensure the maintenance of essential services. The Saskatchewan statute, however, did not treat public 
employees differently than private employees with respect to their obligations. The statute covered all 
persons involved in a strike in public utilities or hospitals which created "a state of emergency." Id. 
30. 1966-1967 Sask. Stat. ch. 2, § 10. 
31. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 972. See also Public Interest Disputes, supra note 22, at 43. 
32. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 972. 
33. Id. at 973. In Ontario, for example, the legislature repealed a provision enabling municipalities to 
opt out of the Labour Relations Act. See Act of May 18, 1966, ch. 76, § 37, 1966 Ont. Stat. 311. 
34. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 973. 
35. Lab. Code, QUE. REv. STAT. ch. 141, § 99 (1964), as amended, Act of June 17, 1965, ch. 50,1965 
Que. Stat. (vol. 1) 401; Civil Service Act, 1965 Que. Stat. ch. 14, §§ 68-75. This statute brought public 
employees within the realm of general labor relation legislation. The Quebec Labor Code encompassed 
"employees of a public service," which included employees of the provincial government, and employ-
ees of a variety of municipal, charitable and educational institutions, public utilities and other gov-
ernmental and quasi-governmental bodies.ld. §§ l(n), 99. See also Civil Service Act, 1965 Que. Stat. 
ch. 14, §§ 68-75. 
Unions representing provincial governmental employees may not strike until they have arranged to 
maintain "essential services." Certain employees, such as peace officers, prison guards and transporta-
tion inspectors, may not strike. 1965 Que. Stat. ch. 14, §§ 69(d) , 75. Courts may e~oin a strike which 
imperils the public health or safety pending investigation by a fact-finding tribunal. Lab. Code, QUE. 
REv. STAT. ch. 141, § 99 (1964). One of the major flaws of the Quebec statute is that the statute allows 
disputes over the essentiality of stricter services to be conducted while the strike is in progress.Id.; Public 
Interest Disputes, supra note 22, at 46. 
36. Lab. Code, QUE. REv. STAT. ch. 141, § 99. 
37. Public Interest Disputes, supra note 22, at 46. Arthurs attributes the large number of strikes to the 
militancy of the unions in reaction to three factors: (I) the revocation of a statute, the Public Service 
Employees Disputes Act, QUE. REv. STAT. ch. 169 (1941), which for over 20 years had inhibited the 
bargaining activities of the public employees; (2) the outpouring of resentment after decades of 
frustration over lack of collective bargaining rights; and (3) the spirit of Quebec's "quiet revolution," 
transposed from the political to the economic sphere. Public Interest Disputes, supra note 22, at 46. 
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lead in granting its employees collective bargaining rights in 1968,38 as did 
Newfoundland in 197039 and British Columbia in 1973.40 Newfoundland later 
~amended its legislation in 1972,41 placing greater restriotions on the exercise of 
the right to strike than other jurisdictions did. 42 The other provinces also 
granted their employees collective bargaining rights but continued to deny them 
the legal right to strike.43 
III. THE PuBLIC SERVICE STAFF RELATIONS ACT 
The Canadian federal government, following the example of the provinces, 
granted its employees44 extensive collective bargaining rights45 by enacting the 
Public Service Staff Relations Act (the Act) in March, 1967,46 after almost three 
years of preparation.47 The Act was designed to provide for the establishment of 
a collective bargaining system for public employees and for the resolution of 
disputes arising in the negotiation of collective agreements. 48 An essential fea-
ture of the Act is that it provides a systematic process for resolving public sector 
labor disputes. 49 
A. The Administration of the Act 
The Public Service Staff Relations Board (PSSRB) administers the provisions 
of the Public Service Staff Relations Act.50 The PSSRB oversees certification, 
designations, complaints, questions of law, strike declarations, prosecution of 
violators of the Act and regulation. 51 The PSSRB is composed of two neutral 
heads52 and equal representation of the interests of employers and employees,53 
38. Public Service Labour Relations Act, N.B. STAT. ch. 88 (1968). 
39. The Labour Relations Act, NFLD. REv. STAT. ch. 191, § 3 (1970). 
40. Labour Relations Act, B.C. STAT. ch. 122 (1973). 
41. The St. John's Fire Department Act, Nfld. Stat. No. 12 (1972). Section 19 of the Act forbids 
firemen to strike. 
42. Public Interest Disputes, supra note 22, at 46. 
43. /d. 
44. "Federal employees" are all employees of the Canadian federal government. Arthurs, supra note 
2, at 971. 
45. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35 (1970). Collective bargaining rights included in the Act are exclusive 
representation rights (§ 40( I)(a» for a certified bargaining agent (§ 34), the right of every employee to 
be a member of an employee organization and to participate in the lawful activities of that organization 
(§ 6), and a choice of two methods of dispute resolution (§ 36(1»: arbitration (§ 63) or conciliation 
(§§ 52, 53). Employees maintain a limited right to strike (§ 101). 
46. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35. 
47. Anderson & Kochan, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service of Canada, 32 RELATIONS INDUS-
TRIELLES 234 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Anderson & Kochan]. 
48. Finkelman, Public Service Staff Relations Act, CANADIAN LABOR, Sept. 1968, at 28. 
49. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, §§ 59-89. 
50. Id. § 18. 
51. /d. § 19; Gillespie, The Public Service Staff Relations Board, 30 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 628, 630 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Gillespie]. 
52. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 11(2); Gillespie, supra note 51, at 628. 
53. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35. § 11(1). 
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all appointed by the Governor in Council.54 The provisions of the Act grant the 
members of the PSSRB relatively long terms in office in an effort to ensure their 
independence from political or other influence.55 
The PSSRB is responsible for the administration of the Arbitration Tri-
bunal,56 which deals with interest disputes,57 and a corps of adjudicators,58 who 
deal with grievances.59 In addition, the chairman of the PSSRB has the power to 
appoint conciliators and expert or technical assistants.6o These powers further 
ensure the PSSRB's impartiality and freedom from public employer influence.61 
Such a neutral administration of the Act greatly encourages dispute resolution in 
the public sector.62 Since the Act engenders fairness and impartiality in labor 
relations, Canadian public employees are more likely to trust the decision ren-
dered by the system than if the dispute resolution mechanism were controlled by 
the government.63 
In contrast to Canada's impartial system, the typical advisory body in the 
United States often is created by executive order and exists by the grace of the 
appointing power. 64 This government-controlled situation may cause public 
employees to feel that a recommendation by such an advisory body is biased.65 
Thus, Canadian public employees are more likely to trust and respect advisory 
recommendations than their counterparts in the United States. Such trust and 
respect encourages better labor relations, since employees and employers In 
Canada tend to be satisfied with the results of arbitration. 
B. Public Sector Bargaining Units in Canada 
1. Structure and Function 
Pursuant to the Public Service Staff Relations Act,66 the Public Service Com-
mission67 has established a new government-wide job classification system.68 The 
54. ld. § 11(2)-(3). 
55. ld. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the PSSRB hold office for ten years, but may be 
removed at any time by the Governor in Council upon the address of the Senate and House of 
Commons.ld. § 11(2). Other members of the PSSRB are appointed for a seven-year term, and they may 
be removed for cause at any time by the Governor in Council. ld. § 11(3). 
56. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, §§ 23, 60. The PSSRB has the power to appoint members of the 
Arbitration Tribunal. ld. § 60( I). 
57. ld. § 70. 
58. ld. §§ 23, 92. The PSSRB nominates adjudicators for cabinet appointment. ld. § 92. The 
Governor in Council designates one of the adjudicators to be chief adjudicator on the recommendation 
of the PSSRB. ld. 
59. ld. § 92. 
60.ld. § 17(4). 
61. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 981. 
62. ld. at 981-82. 
63. ld. at 982. 
64.ld. 
65.ld. 
66. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35. 
67. The Public Service Commission administers the Public Service Employment Act, 1966-1967 Can. 
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Public Service Commission classified seventy-two occupational groups into five 
occupational categories: operational (blue-collar), administrative support, tech-
nical, administrative and foreign service.6!1 In recognizing the unique interests of 
each group, the Act designated each of the seventy-two occupational groups as a 
bargaining unieo and granted them the right to bargain collectively.71 Employ-
ees soon exercised their right to bargain collectively. Union organization has 
increased rapidly in the Canadian public sector,72 in large part due to the 
adoption of collective bargaining rights at the federal and provincial levels. 73 
At the federal level, ninety-five percent of all federal employees negotiate with 
the Treasury Board through bargaining units. 74 In addition, a few large unions 
are certified to represent a number of bargaining units. 75 However, even though 
one union may represent a large number of employees in different bargaining 
units,76 the overall structure of collective bargaining remains quite frag-
mented. 77 This fragmentation is due primarily to the fact that bargaining units 
usually choose to bargain separately.78 Bargaining units value their autonomy 
Stat. ch. 71, § 2, which establishes and implements the civil service or "merit" procedure of appointments 
and promotions, and provides a mechanism for employee training and development programs. Ar-
thurs, supra note 2, at 982. Now that public employees participate in the collective bargaining process, 
this area of responsibility has diminished. /d. Jurisdictional boundary problems still remain between the 
Public Service Commission and the other bodies engaged in administering the collective bargaining 
process .. [d. 
68. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 26(1). 
69. [d. § 2. The occupational groups include all public employees employed by the Treasury Board, 
the government employer with which 95% of all Canadian federal employees negotiate. Anderson, 
Determinants of Bargaining Outcomes in the Federal Government of Canada, 32 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 224, 228 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Anderson]. The remaining federal employees work for "separate" employ-
ers, which are semi-autonomous government agencies and commissions. Id. 
70. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, §§ 2, 26(3). A bargaining agent is the representative for'employees in a 
labor dispute. An employee organization becomes a bargaining agent in Canada upon certification by 
the Public Service Staff Relations Board (§ 34), which must be satisfied that a majority of employees in a 
bargaining unit wish the employee organization to represent them as their bargaining agent. [d. § 34(c). 
Note the distinction between a bargaining agent and a bargaining unit. A bargaining unit is a group of 
two or more employees determined to constitute a unit of employees appropriate for collective 
bargaining. [d. 
71. Anderson & Kochan, supra note 47, at 236. 
72. From 1962 to 1977, membership in government employee organizations rose 150%, compared 
with an 86% increase in overall Canadian union membership. Lewin & Goldenberg, Public Sector 
Unionism in the U.S. and Canada, 19 IND. REL. 239, 242 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Lewin & Goldenberg]. 
73. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35. 
74. Anderson, supra note 69, at 228. 
75. Feuille & Anderson, supra note 14, at 311. 
76. An example is the Canadian Union of Public Employees, Canada's largest union, which repre-
sents most civilian municipal workers. [d. 
77. /d. 
78. [d. For example, the Canadian Union of Public Employees has had a near-monopoly on civilian 
municipal employees for decades, and yet the units it represents often choose to bargain separately. [d. 
Bargaining units in the United States also generally bargain separately. For example, the American 
Federation of State and Municipal Employees represents a number of units, but these units usually 
bargain separately. /d. 
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and independence in decision making,79 primarily because differences in the 
characteristics of bargaining units can constitute significant sources of bargain-
ing power. so Each unit has bargained with the government over previous agree-
ments, and can use provisions won earlier as a basis for future negotiation and 
leverage.sl Furthermore, each occupational category bargains for provisions in 
their collective agreement which are unique to that category.82 
The standardization of collective agreements across all occupational groups, 
and particularly within each of the five occupational categories,83 is attributable 
to the process of "pattern-bargaining," in which agreements are patterned after 
those made by other bargaining units. 84 Since the unions and the employer know 
what benefits have been offered to other units, employers tend to have difficulty 
"withhold[ing] benefits given to one group from other groups working for the 
same em ployer in the same work environment."85 In addition, because the 
bargaining units negotiate under the same labor relations statute and in the same 
economic climate,86 the resulting bargaining agreements generally do not vary 
substantially.87 
2. Bargainable Issues 
Although wages and a broad range of working conditions constitute proper 
bargaining subjects in all Canadian jurisdictions, 88 the Act restricts the scope of 
bargaining issues in the federal public sector. 89 One provision of the Act prohib-
its negotiations on issues which are covered by other legislation.90 This provision 
seriously limits the scope of bargaining issues by prohibiting bargaining of such 
issues as pensions, promotions, demotions, layoffs and workmen's compensa-
tion.9l Moreover, the employer retains the power to determine organization, 
79. Anderson, supra note 69, at 237. 
80. Significant characteristics of bargaining units include membership, dispersion, and occupational 
category . [d. at 236. 
81. [d. 
82. [d. at 237. For example, operational groups have bargained for a number of pay supplements for 
the type of work performed (e.g., driving duty), while the scientific and professional groups have a series 
ofleave provisions related to education and career development. Anderson & Kochan, supra note 47, at 
236. 
83. Anderson & Kochan, supra note 47, at 236-37; Anderson, supra note 69, at 236. 
84. Anderson, supra note 69, at 236. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. See CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35. 
87. Anderson, supra note 69, at 236. 
88. Lewin & Goldenberg, supra note 72, at 249. 
89. See, e.g., CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 56. 
90. [d. § 56(2)(a). 
91. Anderson & Kochan, supra note 47, at 238. Note that often these issues are not bargainable in the 
United States public sector either, although the exclusion of these issues "seems to stem more from 
management policy than from legal policy." Lewin & Goldenberg,supra note 72, at 251. However, when 
unions have been insistent, they have managed to include some of these normally excluded issues in 
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assign duties and classify positions.92 Thus, under the Act, many key issues over 
which private sector employees may negotiate cannot be bargained for in the 
public sector.93 
C. Dispute Resolution: Arbitration v. Conciliation 
The Act provides a systematic process for resolving public sector labor dis-
putes.94 First, a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit95 must select a 
bargaining agent96 to represent them. Then the PSSRB must certify the bargain-
ing agent as the representative of the bargaining unit. 97 Before facing a possible 
labor dispute, the agent must choose one of two methods of resolving a dispute, 
either arbitration98 or conciliation.99 The method chosen has a significant im pact 
on the outcome of the dispute. 
A bargaining agent is not bound absolutely to the choice of dispute resolution 
made immediately following certification. loo An agent may change dispute reso-
lution procedures before giving notice for negotiations of a subsequent con-
tract. IOI Once the bargaining agent has chosen a method, the agent may not 
change this method during the negotiation of that particular contract. 102 The 
employer is excluded from the process of choosing a dispute resolution 
method 103 and is bound by the bargaining agent's choice. l04 
1. Arbitration 
If the bargaining agent has chosen arbitration as its method of dispute resolu-
tion, the parties to a dispute must follow the procedures outlined in the Act. 
Once the employer and the bargaining agent reach an impasse in bargaining, 
either party may request that the PSSRB appoint a conciliator to confer with the 
parties to help reach an agreement. 105 However, if the parties are still unable to 
reach an agreement, either party may request that the Arbitration Tribunap06 
bargaining. [d. "In Canada, but not in the United States, some legally excluded bargaining subjects have 
been handled separately, with agreement taking the form of a 'letter of understanding' between the 
parties rather than forming part of the collective contract itself." !d. 
92. Anderson & Kochan, supra note 47, at 238. 
93. [d. 
94. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, §§ 59-89. 
95. [d. § 2. See note 6 supra. 
96. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 2. See note 70, supra. 
97. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 27. 
98. [d. §§ 59(a), 60-76. 
99. [d. §§ 59(b), 77-89. 
100. [d. § 38. 
101. [d. §§ 37(2) & 38(3); Anderson & Kochan, supra note 47, at 239. 
102. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 38(3). 
103. [d. § 36(1). 
104. [d. § 37(2). 
105. [d. § 52. 
106. [d. § 60. 
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issue an arbitral award. 107 This request may be made where no collective bar-
gaining agreement is in force 108 or, if there is an agreement, not later than seven 
days after t he parties have entered into that agreement. 109 
In the arbitration process, the arbitral award is the final, binding step yo Since 
arbitral awards are binding on the parties to the dispute,1l1 employees may not 
strike once their bargaining agent has chosen arbitration. 112 Arbitral awards may 
deal with "rates of pay, hours of work, leave entitlements, standards of discipline, 
and other terms and conditions of employment related thereto."113 An arbitral 
award may not focus on "the standards, procedures or processes governing the 
appointment, appraisal, promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off or release of 
employees."114 In addition, arbitral awards may only address issues presented by 
the parties.115 
The Act provides general guidelines for arbitrators to follow in rendering an 
arbitral award. 116 It requires arbitrators to consider such factors as conditions in 
similar occupations in the private sector117 and the need for qualified employees 
in public service .118 The intent of the general arbitration guidelines is to ensure 
that public employees choosing the arbitration method of dispute resolution 
enjoy wages and working conditions comparable to their private sector counter-
parts. 119 
Another governmental body that encourages equalization of wages and work-
ing conditions in the public and private sectors is the Pay Research Bureau,t20 a 
highly regarded organization which generates objective, factual information on 
wages and working conditions in both the public and private sectors.121 Al-
though under the administrative aegis of the PSSRB, the Bureau operates 
independently.122 In deciding what information it should obtain, the Bureau 
seeks advice from employers and all certified bargaining agents. 123 By consulting 
107. [d. § 63. 
108. [d. § 63(1)(a). 
109. [d. § 63(1)(b). 
110. [d. § 72(1). 
111. [d. § 72(1). 
112. [d. §§ 72(1), 10 1 (l)(b). 
113. [d. § 71. 
114. [d. § 70(3). 
115. [d. 
116. [d. § 68. 
117. [d. § 68(b). 
118. [d. § 68(a). 
119. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 991. 
120. See generally Gillespie, supra note 51, at 637-38. The Pay Research Bureau has operated under 
the administrative aegis of the Chairman of the PSSRB since March 1967. [d. at 637. Note that the 
United States has no counterpart for the Pay Research Bureau. [d. at 638. 
121. [d. at 638. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. 
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with both management and labor, the Bureau attempts to remain responsive to 
the needs of both the employer and the bargaining agent in collective bargain-
ing.124 The Bureau is able to remain neutral since it does not participate in the 
negotiation of collective agreements as in setting wages. 125 
While the Act does not require arbitrators or parties to a dispute to use the 
information which the Bureau provides, they often consider it. 126 In comparing 
public and private wages and working conditions, arbitrators rely heavily on the 
Bureau's information. 127 Oftentimes the information has had a significant effect 
on the speed with which parties have settled their disputes or whether they have 
reached an impasse in negotiations. 128 The use of objective data on wages and 
working conditions generated by a neutral agency encourages faster resolutions 
of disputes. 129 
The Act provides a solid structure for the arbitration process and a set of 
guidelines which encourage resolution of disputes in an equitable manner. By 
requiring that arbitrators consider conditions in similar occupations in the pri-
vate sector before rendering an arbitral award, the Act attempts to equalize 
wages and working conditions in the public and private sectors. In addition, the 
Pay Research Bureau supports the intent of the Act and furthers this goal by 
providing objective, factual information on such sectors to arbitrators and par-
ties to the dispute. Thus, the arbitration procedure outlined in the Act promotes 
a fair and effective means of dispute resolution. 
2. Conciliation 
If conciliation is the chosen method of resolving a dispute, the parties follow a 
much different set of procedures than they do for arbitration. The first step, 
however, is identical to the first step in the arbitration route. Upon reaching an 
impasse, either party may request that the PSSRB appoint a conciliator to 
facilitate negotiations. 13o Then eithe'f party may request that the Chairman of 
the PSSRB establish a conciliation board to investigate and conciliate the dis-
pute. 131 The Chairman then appoints a conciliation board unless he or she 
believes that the establishment of such a board will not help the parties reach 
agreement. 132 The conciliation board reports its findings and recommendations 
124. Id. 
125. !d. 
126. !d. 
127. !d. Private sector comparable wage data has been the strongest independent predictor of 
occupational wage levels. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 52. 
131. Id. §§ 77, 84(1). 
132. Id. § 78(1). 
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to the Chairman of the PSSRB,t33 who subsequently sends copies to both par-
ties.134 
A recommendation by the conciliation board is binding only where the parties 
so agree in writing before the board has made its final report. 135 The report,138 
like an arbitral award,137 may not contain any recommendation "concerning the 
standards, procedures or processes governing the appointment, appraisal, 
promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off or release of employees."138 However, 
unlike an arbitral award, the report may discuss issued not presented by the 
parties. 139 This feature allows the conciliator to consider a broader spectrum of 
possible resolutions. The conciliator may make a recommendation involving 
compromises on issues not presented by the parties, thus helping to resolve the 
dispute in a more creative and lasting manner than if he was limited to consider-
ing a few specified issues. Since the report is not binding, the bargaining agent 
may reject the report in favor of a strike. 140 Once the Chairman has received the 
report, the bargaining agent must wait seven days before initiating a strike.141 
3. Arbitration v. Conciliation 
In choosing a method of dispute resolution, the bargaining agent must con-
sider the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. While conciliation 
offers the bargaining agent the right to strike if a settlement is disagreeable, 142 
arbitration is an attractive alternative for several reasons.143 Both employers and 
employees tend to trust the Arbitration TribunaP44 because of its highly compe-
tent staffing, and its neutral, equitable decision making process. The Act pro-
vides general guidelines for arbitrators to follow in rendering awards which 
encourage fairness to both parties. In attempting to ensure that the public sector 
is treated like the private sector, the Act fosters equality in wages and working 
conditions in both sectors. Arbitral awards often are based on concrete, reliable 
information regarding wages and working conditions generated by a neutral 
agency. Thus, parties tend to trust and accept arbitral awards as being fair and 
equitable. In addition, the fact that the bargaining agent has opted for arbitra-
133. [d. § 86(1). 
134. [d. § 87. 
135. [d. § 89. 
136. A report may not be used aa evidence in any Canadian court except for prosecution of peIjury. 
ld. § 88. 
137. [d. § 70(3). 
138. [d. § 86(3). 
139. [d. § 86(4). 
140. [d. §§ 89, 10 1. 
141. [d. § 101(2)(b)(I). 
142. [d. § 101; see Arthurs, supra note 2, at 987. 
143. See generally Gillespie, supra note 51, at 634-35. 
144. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 991. 
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tion, thereby consciously forfeiting the right to strike, indicates to the govern-
ment that the union is willing to accept the outcome of the process.145 
Arbitration is particularly appealing to weaker bargaining units, which Jack the 
financial and social power to strike.146 A strike by a weak bargaining unit may 
have no effect at all on the public, and perhaps only minimal impact on the 
em ployer .147 Arbitration prevents the em ployer from making unilateral deci-
sions on wages and working conditions which affect weaker unions.148 Stronger 
bargaining units may also favor arbitration because of the fairness of arbitral 
awards. 149 If they do not like the results, however, they can choose to switch to 
conciliation when negotiating a contract in the future. 15o 
Conciliation has its own distinct advantages. Under this method, the scope of 
bargaining is much broader because a conciliation board may address issues not 
presented by the parties. 151 Conciliation also leaves open the possibility of a 
strike if the bargaining agent expresses dissatisfaction with the board's report. 152 
The realization that a strike is always a possibility may encourage an employer to 
resolve the dispute in the early stages of the conciliation process. Thus, bargain-
ing units may opt for conciliation, using the strike option as an additional 
bargaining chip. 
D. The Right to Strike: Statutory Restrictions 
The Act does not explicitly grant public employees the right to strike for two 
reasons.153 First, since no Canadian court has clearly held that strikes by public 
employees are per se illegaJ,154 Parliament did not have to legislate a change to 
make strikes legal.155 Second, although Canadian labor relations statutes seldom 
expressly granted the right to strike, the courts have determined that such 
legislation impliedly incorporates the common law right to strike. 1s6 
The provisions of the Act do not grant the right to strike to all federal public 
employees. 157 In strike situations, the PSSRB functions as the "protector of the 
145. [d. 
146. Gillespie, sufrra note 51, at 635. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. Arthurs, sufrra note 2, at 991. 
150. [d. at 990. See also CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 38, which outlines the procedure for altering the 
process for dispute resolution. 
151. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 86(4). 
152. [d. § 101. 
153. The Act discusses situations in which striking is prohibited; thus the right to strike is implied in 
all other situations. See id. 
154. The issue was raised, and avoided, in A.G. British Columbia v. Ellsay & B.C. Govt. Employees 
Assn., 15 CLLC. 262 (1959 B.C. Sup. Ct.). 
155. See Arthurs, sufrra note 2, at 987. 
156. [d.; see also Regina v. CPR ex rei. Zambri, 1962 S.C.R. 609. 
157. CAN. REv. STAT. cit. P-35, § 101. 
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public interest"158 by forbidding certain "designated employees"159 from strik-
ing.160 If a bargaining agent chooses the conciliation method of resolving a 
dispute,161 the PSSRB must determine which employees in a bargaining unit are 
"designated employees," namely those "whose duties consist in whole or in part 
of duties the performance of which ... is or will be necessary in the interest of 
the safety or security of the public."162 Conversely, nondesignated em ployees 
may strike,I63 even though their absence would adversely affect the public 
interest, convenience or weifare. 164 
The employer is responsible for initiating the process for designating employ-
ees.165 Within twenty days after receipt of the notice to bargain, the employer 
must furnish the bargaining agent and the PSSRB with a list of employees whom 
the employer characterizes as "designated employees."166 If the bargaining agent 
does not object to the list of em ployees within a time period prescribed by the 
PSSRB, the employees become designated employees l67 and, as such, may not 
strike under any circumstances.168 If the bargaining agent objects to the employ-
er's designation of employees, the PSSRB, after allowing each side to "make 
representations,"169 determines which employees are designated employees. A 
determination of designated employees by the PSSRB is final and conclusive,17° 
Allowing employers and the PSSRB to designate "essential employees" has the 
effect of severely circumscribing the right of public employees to strike.l7l In 
many cases, more than ninety percent of the employees in a bargaining unit are 
designated.172 Such restrictions on the right to strike have resulted in allowing 
strikes only by those bargaining units strong enough to impose the greatest costs 
on the em ployer and the public and financially secure enough to bear the costs of 
a strike. 17 3 
The status of a collective bargaining agreement also ,!-ffects the exercise of the 
158. Gillespie, supra note 51, at 631. 
159. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 79(1). 
160. [d. § 101(I)(c). 
161. See notes 130-35 and accompanying text supra. 
162. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 79(1). "The definition of safety and security ofthe public is difficult 
~t best. .However, designations have not seemed to follow any systematic pattern in the past .... It is 
mterestmg to note that no employees of the post office appear to be considered essential .... " Anderson 
& Kochan, supra note 47, at 242 n.15. 
163. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 101. 
164. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 988. 
165. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 79(2). 
166. [d. 
167. [d. § 79(3). 
168. [d. § 101(1)(c). 
169. [d. § 79(3). 
170. [d. § 79(4). 
171. Anderson & Kochan, supra note 47, at 242. 
172. [d. 
173. [d. 
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right to strike. 174 The Act prohibits strikes while a collective agreement is in 
effect. 175 If no agreement is in force, and the dispute has gone through the 
conciliation process, employees must wait for seven days after the Chairman of 
the PSSRB receives the report of an established conciliation board before they 
may strike. '76 In addition, the bargaining agent must have exhausted the concili-
ation procedure before calling a strike. 177 
Although the Act provides public employees with extensive collective bargain-
ing rights, it severely circumscribes the public sector's right to strike by restrict-
ing the number of employees who may exercise that right. 178 Public employees 
mayor may not enjoy the right to strike depending on the nature of their job, 179 
their status in the bargaining unit or the status of the dispute 180 and the collective 
bargaining agreement. 181 Designated employees and employees without a cer-
tified bargaining agent may not participate in a strike. 182 As previously discussed, 
the Act also prohibits striking by employees when their bargaining unit has 
chosen arbitration as its method of dispute resolution or while a collective 
bargaining agreement is in effect. 183 Thus, the government limits and controls 
the situations in which striking is allowed. 
E. The Application of the Act: The Postal Workers Strike of 1968 
Only one year after the enactment of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, 
Canadian postal workers, who had a long history of militancy, 184 initiated the 
first legal strike by federal workers.185 Following an unsuccessful attempt at 
conciliation, the postal workers went on strike from July 18 to August 8, 1968, 
after the government refused its wage demands. 186 After resolving several issues 
through a conciliation board,187 the government and the union became dead-
174. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 101(2). 
175. /d. § 10 1(2)(a). 
176. [d. § 101(2)(b)(i). 
177. [d. § 101(2)(b). 
178. [d. § 101. 
179. [d. § 10 1 (l)(c). The nature of an employee's job controls whether that employee is designated as 
essential. 
180. [d. § 101(l)(a). 
181. [d. § 101(1)(b). 
182. [d. § 101(1)(a), 101(1)(c). 
183. /d. § 101(1)(b). 
184. On a number of occasions, the postal workers, both national and local union groups, had 
threatened to strike, and in 1965, actually walked out for 17 days. Arthurs, supra note 2, at 992. The 
postal workers' unions tended to be militant for a number of reasons, including "deep-seated grievances 
against poor working conditions; departmental management which was understaffed and ill-prepared 
for collective bargaining; a new union leadership cognizant of the fact that their predecessors had been 
purged as 'moderates'; and overtones of French Canadian nationalism in the Montreal local union." [d. 
185. [d. 
186. /d. 
187. [d. 
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locked on the issue of the union's high wage demands. 188 The government, 
considering the union's wage demands excessive,189 failed to react to these 
demands for higher salaries until the strike was imminent. 19o Canadian public 
reaction to the announcement of the strike was quite mild, and the press initially 
was supportive of the employees and critICal of the government's failure to make 
an earlier wage offer. 191 Despite the inevitable inconveniences and extra costs 
which a postal workers' strike entails,192 the work stoppage did not cause a major 
communications crisis. 193 
Public sympathy for the strikers waned as the strike progressed, and pressure 
mounted for legislation to end the walkout.194 Public pressure to end the strike 
placed the government in a difficult position. On the one hand, the government 
did not want to rescind the newly enacted right to strike and hesitated to 
confront the near certain defiance which a back-to-work order would bring. 195 
On the other hand, the government could not realistically capitulate to the 
union's extreme wage demands. 196 In addition, the government had no guaran-
tee that the militant union members would even accept a recommendation by 
their negotiating team. 197 The government also feared that its capitulating to the 
postal union in the conciliation process would disillusion other unions which had 
chosen the arbitration process for resolving their disputes. 198 The union eventu-
ally succumbed to the pressures of threats of special anti-strike legislation,199 
increasing public hostility toward the strike200 and financial burdens on the 
individual union members, who were receiving no strike pay.201 
While the postal workers' strike caused some public inconvenience, it did 
exemplify the positive as pects of the Public Service Staff Relations Act. 202 First, a 
postal workers' strike may have been inevitable, considering the union's history 
188. !d. Other circumstances had impeded negotiations: a federal election took place during the 
bargaining; a new Postmaster General took office; critics called for an overhaul of postal services and 
mail rates; and the government tried to put a cap on inflation by encouraging a policy of wage restraint 
throughout the economy. [d. 
189. The postal workers were asking for wage increases above those which had been accepted by 
unions subject to arbitration. [d. at 993. 
190. [d. at 992. 
191. [d. 
192. !d. 
193. [d. Because the postal workers had previously struck for 17 days in 1965, many businesses were 
prepared to continue serving customers and collecting accounts during the strike. !d. For example, 
welfare agencies used alternate devices to serve their clients. [d. 
194. [d. at 993. 
195. [d. 
196. [d. 
197. [d. 
198. !d. 
199. [d. 
200. [d. 
201. [d. 
202. [d. 
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of labor relations problems. 203 Allowing the postal workers to strike within the 
guidelines of the Act maintained their freedom to bargain collectively and to 
strike,204 while at the same time forcing the workers to exhaust the conciliation 
process set out in the Act. These procedures may have prevented both parties 
from adopting extreme positions from which they could not retreat without a 
loss of face. In the end, the union accepted the government's wage offer, 
indicating that the government retained some leverage over the union even 
during the strike. The statute precluded the necessity of taking extra measures, 
such as court injunctions, to enforce its provisions. The postal workers may have 
ignored these enforcement measures even if they had been imposed. Therefore, 
the government could avoid the awkward situation of confronting such a blatant 
violation of the law and the time-consuming enforcement procedures.205 Many 
factors such as public hostility may have contributed to a faster, more lasting 
resolution than would have resulted if the parties had proceeded through 
arbitration or the court system. 206 However, these benefits must be weighed 
against other factors, such as the inconvenience to the public, in determining 
whether the strike weapon was ultimately successful and beneficial not only for 
the public employees, but for the public as a whole.207 
IV. THE PUBLIC SECTOR'S RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Background of Public Employee Collective Bargaining Rights in the United States 
Collective bargaining rights for public employees are substantially more lim-
ited in the United States than in Canada. 208 While public employees of both 
nations enjoy the right to organize collectively and to select representatives for 
the purpose of engaging in collective bargaining,209 public employees in the 
United States generally do not enjoy the right to strike. 210 Pursuant to an 
203. [d. 
204. /d. 
205. [d. 
206. [d. 
207. ld. 
208. For a discussion of public employees' constitutional right to bargain collectively, see United 
Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971), discussed in 
notes 214, 215 infra. Cf CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35. 
209. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. I, 33 (1937), which stated that the right to organize 
collectively and to select representatives for the purposes of engaging in collective bargaining is a 
fundamental right protected by the Constitution. 
210. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1975), prohibiting strikes by federal employees; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
19, § 1312 (1979), denying all public employees the right to strike. See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.12 
(West 1978); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 150E, § 9A (Michie/Law Co-op 1976); MINN. STAT. AMM. § 179.64 
(West Supp. 1980). For a rationale for upholding the constitutional validity of denying public employees 
the right to strike, see Blount, 325 F. Supp. at 879, discussed in notes 214, 215 infra. 
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amendment to the Civil Services Act,211 all federal employees must take an oath 
not to engage in strike activity.212 Violation of the oath may subject the employee 
to immediate dismissa1.213 
Although private employees enjoy the right to strike by statute,214 public 
em ployees generally may not strike absent a specific statutory provision.215 
Twenty-four states have enacted statutes explicitly prohibiting public employee 
strikes,216 and fourteen others do not address the issue in legislation.217 Eight 
211. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1975). This statute applies to all federal employees. This statute states: 
An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States ... if 
he-
... (3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government of the 
United States ... ; or (4) is a member of an organization of employees of the Government of 
the United States ... that he knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of the 
United States ... . 
The statute does not require automatic dismissal; rather, it gives the government the right to fire the 
striking employee. 
212. Paragraph C of the appointment affidavit required by 5 U.S.C. § 3333 (1975), which all federal 
employees are required to execute under oath, states (POD Form 61): "I am not participating in any 
strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and 1 will not so participate 
while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof." 
213. See, e.g., Blount, 325 F. Supp. at 879; National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 
546 (D. D.C. 1969), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1971). Violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1975) is 
punishable by not more than $1,000 fine, or imprisonment for not more than one year and a day, or 
both. 5 U.S.C. § 1918 (1976). 
214. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976). At common law, no employee, whether public or private, had a constitutional 
right to strike in concert with fellow workers. Blount, 325 F. Supp. at 882. The National Labor Relations 
Act 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976) granted private employees the right to strike. This Act guaranteed 
employees in the private sector the right to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective 
bargaining.ld. § 157. 
215. Congress has consistently treated public and private employees differently. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 
at 882. The Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act 29 U .S.C. § 152 (1976) defined "employer" 
as not including any governmental or political subdivisions, and thereby indirectly withheld the right to 
strike from governmental employees. See note 214 supra. Section 305 of the Labor Management 
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1947) made a federal employee's participation in a strike 
unlawful, and this participation was made punishable by immediate discharge and forfeiture of civil 
service status. Section 305 was repealed in 1955 by Public Law 330 (69 Stat. 624 (1955», and reenacted 
in 5 U.S.C. § 118p-4 (uncodified), the predecessor to 5U.S.C. § 7311 (1975). See generally Blount, 325 F. 
Supp. at 879. 
The court in Blount noted that the right to strike is not implied from the right to associate and bargain 
collectively. 325 F. Supp. at 883-84. While in the private sector, employees may use the strike to equalize 
bargaining power, in the public sector strikes only serve "to influence the essentially political decisions of 
Government in the allocation of its resources." Id at 884. The court claimed that by prohibiting public 
sector strikes, Congress is upholding its duty to continue the functioning of the federal government at 
all times without interference. Id. 
The court in Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. Ct. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1969), 
held that absent legislative authorization, public employees do not have the right to strike or bargain 
collectively. See alw Norwalk Teacher's Assoc. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 
(1951), where the court held that public employees could not participate in strikes, work stoppages or 
collective refusals to perform. 
216. The 24 states which statutorily prohibit public employee strikes are: Alaska, California, Connect-
icut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, 
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states grant some public employees the right to strike,218 although often only in 
limited circumstances.219 These statutes generally prohibit strikes which would 
create a danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. 220 
However, most of these statutes authorize injunctive relief once the employer 
has proven that a strike would endanger or threaten public health, safety or 
welfare. 221 
Courts consistently have upheld the validity of statutes prohibiting public 
sector strikes.222 Courts have cited several reasons for upholding no strike 
statutes. Some courts state that governmental functions should not be impeded 
by public employee strikes. 223 In Gardner v. Broderick, the Supreme Court held 
that, since a public employee owes his entire loyalty to the city or state employer, 
public employee strikes should be prohibited.224 Similarly, a New York court 
Washington and Wisconsin. See 2 PUB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REp. (CCH) 116500 (1979). See, e.g., ALA. 
CODE § 11-43-143 (1975) (firefighters); ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (police; fire protection em-
ployees; jail, prison and other correctional institution employees; hospital employees); CAL. LAB. CODE 
Vol. 44, § 1962 (West 1971) (granting firefighters the right to organize and join labor organizations but 
denying them the right to strike); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-475, 1O-153e (West Supp. 1980) 
(municipal employees; teachers). See generally Podgers, Public Sector Labor Disputes: A Balancing Act for 
Judges, 66 A.B.A.]. 548 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Podgers]. 
217. Those states with no statute explicitly prohibiting strikes are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, 
West Virginia and Wyoming. See 2 PUB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REp. (CCH) II 6500 (1979). 
218. The eight states which grant some public employees the right to strike are Alaska, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Minnesota, Montana (by common law: Montana ex rei. Dept. of Hwys. v. Public Employees Craft 
Council of Montana, 165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974)), Oregon, Pennsylvania and Vermont. E.g., in 
Alaska, employees enjoy a limitesJ right to strike if a work stoppage would not cause serious effects on 
the public. Such employees include public utility, snow removal, sanitation and educational institution 
employees. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972). Vermont allows its municipal employees to strike. VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1978). 
219. Hawaii prohibits participation in a strike by any employee who is not included in an appropriate 
bargaining unit, who is in an appropriate bargaining unit going to arbitration, or who is an essential 
employee, i.e., who has been designated by the public employer to fill an essential position. HAWAII REv. 
STAT. § 89-12 (1980). Firefighters in Idaho may not strike during the terms of a written contract. IDAHO 
CODE § 44-1811 (1977). In Alaska, the public interests of health, safety and welfare limit the right of 
public employees to strike. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972). 
220. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80); ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200; 
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-12. 
221. See note 220 supra. 
222. See, e.g., Blount, 325 F. Supp. at 879 (5 U.S.C. §§ 3333, 7311(3) (1976)); Local 532, American 
Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Employees v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 273 So. 2d 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1973) (FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6); Grandview v. Moore, 481 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (Mo. 
ANN. STAT. § 105.530 (Vernon Supp. 1980)); DiMaggio v. Brown, 19 N.Y.2d 283, 225 N.E.2d 871, 279 
N.Y.S.2d 161 (1967) (N.Y. Civ. Servo Laws § 108 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80)). 
223. See, e.g., Board of Ed. of Community Unit Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 
(1965). The court in this case stated that: "The underlying basis for the policy against strikes by public 
employees is the sound and demanding notion that governmental functions may not be impeded or 
obstructed, as well as the concept that the profit motive, inherent in the principle of free enterprise, is 
absent in the governmental function." !d. at 571-72, 207 N.E.2d at 430. 
224. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277 (1965). 
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upheld the Taylor law's225 ban on strikes on the rationale that public sector 
relations and regulations are constrained by political, rather than economic, 
conditions.226 
Despite the many state prohibitions against public sector strikes, approxi-
mately 400 state and local strikes occur each year in the United States.227 In a 
number of disputes, public employees have chosen to strike despite statutory 
prohibitions, injunctions and penalties.22s Thus, a "schizophrenic system"229 has 
emerged, in which private employees enjoy a wide range of collective bargaining 
rights and the right to strike, while public employees enjoy some collective 
bargaining rights, and, in a small minority of states, limited strike rights. 230 This 
different treatment of public and private sectors has caused public employees to 
complain that the government is not treating them fairly and consequently 
encourages them to defy the laws which are inconsistent in their treatment of 
public and private employees.231 
B. The Violation of Federal Anti-Strike Law: The PATCO Strike 
The strike by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PA TCO) 
in August 1981 is an example of public employee reaction to federal no-strike 
provisions.232 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and PATCO had 
been negotiating a contract for seven months.233 At one point, the parties had 
reached an agreement giving the employees a forty-two month, $40 million 
increase in wages and benefits,234 twice the increase offered to other government 
employees. 235 However, the union then increased its demands to $681 million in 
225. N.Y. CIv. SERVo LAw § 210 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). While the Taylor Law forbids public 
employee strikes, it does not mandate termination of employment for a violation. The Taylor Law 
granted public employees rights that they formerly did not possess, namely, the right to be represented 
by employee organizations, the right to negotiate collectively with public employees and the right to 
require public employers to negotiate and enter into collective agreements with them. [d. 
226. City of N.Y. V. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175,243 N.E.2d 128,295 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1968), application to 
amend remittitur denied, 23 N.Y.2d 766, 244 N.E.2d 472, 286 N.Y.S.2d 956, reh. denied, 396 U.S. 872 
(1969). 
227. Feuille & Anderson, supra note 14, at 317, n.8. 
228. Podgers, supra note 216, at 540. See Cole, Public Employee Strikes - The Law and Possible 
Alternatives, 11 CUM. L. REv. 315, 316 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Cole]. 
229. Podgers,supra note 216, quoting Theodore Kheel, a New York City labor lawyer and mediator. 
[d. 
230. See statutes cited in notes 138 and 145 supra. 
231. Podgers, supra note 216, at 341. 
232. Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1981, at 4, col. 1. 
233. Air Traffic Controllers Strike - Statement and a Question and Answer session following a 
Meeting with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Transportation, 17 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 
845 (Aug. 10, 1981). 
234. [d. See also Striking Air Controllers Fired by President Reagan, 104 MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1981, at 
48 [hereinafter cited as Striking Air Controllers]. 
235. 17 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. at 846. In recognition of the difficult work performed by the air 
traffic controllers, the Government granted the requested increase. /d. 
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wages and benefits,236 including a thirty-two hour work week.237 The Govern-
ment, however, refused to raise its initial offer of a $40 million package. 238 
PATCO members went on strike on August 3, 1981, after soundly rejecting the 
government's $40 million package.239 
PATCO's strike violated federal law which forbids employees from holding 
public office if they strike and requires federal employees to take an oath not to 
strike.240 President Reagan responded to P A TCO's actions by ordering the firing 
of all striking air controllers who did not return to work within forty-eight hours 
of his order. 241 The President stressed that while he respected the right of 
private employees to strike, public employees are not in a position to strike.242 
The government left no doubt of its intention to enforce fully the anti-strike 
laws. 243 
Violation of the federal anti-strike law244 exacted a heavy toll on the union as 
well as on its members.245 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
held both PATCO and its president, Robert Poli, in contempt of court for 
refusing to obey a temporary restraining order, issued on August 3, 1981.246 To 
effectuate compliance with the injunction, the court ordered an accelerated 
schedule of fines to be imposed on the union, beginning twenty-four hours from 
the date and time the court issued its order.247 
Despite the legal sanctions and the government's firm stand, only 800 control-
lers returned to work within the President's forty-eight hour deadline.248 The 
FAA distributed dismissal notices to those who refused to return to work.249 
Shortly thereafter the government sought back-to-work orders in several federal 
district courts.250 Likewise, the courts assessed several fines on PATCO.251 In an 
unprecedented action, the Federal Labor Relations Authority subsequently de-
certified the union. 252 
236. !d. 
237. Striking Air Controllers, supra note 234. 
238. 17 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 846 (Aug. 10, 1981). 
239. !d. 
240. See notes 214, 215 and accompanying text supra. 
241. 17 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 846 (Aug. 10, 1981). 
242. !d. 
243. [d. 
244. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1975). 
245. See PATCO and its President Finedfor Contempt by U.S. District Court, PUB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING 
REp. (CCH) No. 97 (Aug. 6, 1981). 
246. [d. 
247. [d. 
248. Wall St. j., Oct. 23, 1981, at 4, col. 1. Approximately 1500 striking air traffic controllers 
eventually resumed their jobs. !d. 
249. Striking Air Controllers, supra note 234. 
250. !d. 
251. [d. 
252. [d. Following the 1970 strike, PATCO temporarily lost its labor union status for five months. 
Wall St. j., Oct. 23, 11181, at 4, col. 1. Decertification means a union can no longer represent its 
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The im pact of the P A TCO strike and its ramifications on public labor relations 
remain to be seen.253 The Reagan Administration has stressed that it intends to 
take a strong stand against violators of anti-strike laws254 in an effort to curb 
public employee strikes. 255 However, on the state level, such an unbending 
approach has proven ineffective. 256 Even in the face of a multitude of penal-
ties,257 public employees continue to strike in large numbers.258 
C. A Comparison of the Canadian Postal Workers' Strike in 1968 and the U.S. P ATCO 
Strike in 1981 
A comparison of the postal workers' strike in Canada and the P A TCO strike in 
the United States reveals major differences in the public labor relations systems 
of the two nations. 259 In Canada, the postal workers' strike was legal, and the 
government let the strike run its course. While the Canadian government had to 
deal with pressures from the public, the union faced the same public hostility, 
which aided in the resolution of the dispute. The union eventually capitulated, 
and the parties reached a satisfactory agreement. Although the public was 
certainly inconvenienced by the strike, it suffered no permanent or lasting 
injury.26o 
In contrast, the PATCO strike had significant legal ramifications. Since the 
strike was illegal, the U.S. government had the power to impose a number of 
sanctions on the union and its striking members.261 Ultimately, these sanctions 
had profound effects on air traffic services, which were severely disrupted by the 
strike. By firing the striking employees, the government precluded any form of 
settlement with the majority of the federal air traffic controllers, and, in effect, 
aggravated the very situation it sought to remedy. The government's antipathy 
toward public employee strikes is supposedly on behalf of the public interest. 
Ironically, the public suffered from the effects of firing the air traffic controllers. 
If the government had allowed the air traffic controllers to strike, the parties 
may have reached a settlement, as occurred in Canada in the aftermath of the 
postal workers' strike. 
members. Id. Other major unions. wary of participating in an illegal walkout. did not support the 
PATCO strike. Many labor officials privately criticized the union's actions. /d. 
253. The results of the PATCO strike may affect federal. state and local unions which are consider-
ing striking. On April 16. 1982. transit workers struck in Boston. MA. Boston Globe. Apr. 16. 1982. col. 
1. at I. Union officials called off the strike within 24 hours. after the Governor threatened to fire all 
striking employees. Id. 
254. See notes 241 and 243 and accompanying text supra. 
255. /d. 
256. See notes 227 and 228 and accompanying text supra. 
257. See notes 213 and 221 and accompanying text supra. 
258. See note 228 and accompanying text supra. 
259. See generally Public Interest Disputes, supra note 22. at 45. 
260. See note 138 and accompanying text supra. 
261. See notes 241 through 247 and accompanying text supra. 
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By following the Canadian model, the United States could greatly improve 
labor relations in the public sector. Currently, tremendous inequities exist be-
tween public and private sector labor relations. Public employees have reacted by 
striking in violation of the law. One feasible solution to the problem of granting 
public employees more collective bargaining rights while protecting the public 
interest would be to adopt a system like Canada's, in which all essential employ-
ees would be "designated" by an impartial board and would not be able to strike 
as would non-essential employees. Many federal employees engage in duties 
which are not "necessary for the health, safety and welfare of the public." 
Allowing such employees to strike would put them on an equal footing with 
private employees, while preventing strikes injurious to the public. 
The Canadian model could have been applied on the federal level to avert the 
PATCO strike. If an impartial board had designated essential air traffic control-
lers, minimum air operations could have continued, while nonessential employ-
ees struck. Eventually an agreement could have been reached. Instead, the 
President unilaterally fired all striking controllers almost immediately. This mass 
firing had long-term effects on air traffic control, since controllers could not be 
replaced quickly. Thus, adopting legislation such as Canada's, granting limited 
rights to strike to public employees, could improve public sector labor relations 
greatly. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Canadian system of collective bargaining for federal public employees 
differs from the United States' system in substance, procedure and intent. 
Canadian public employees have had a history of extensive collective bargaining 
rights, and the vast majority of jurisdictions now allow some form of public 
sector striking. Public employees in the United States face a policy of traditional 
governmental resistance to granting its employees collective bargaining rights, in 
particular the right to strike. While eight states granted some of their public 
employees limited strike rights during the 1970-1980 period, this slow trend 
does not seem to be gaining widespread acceptance. Certainly the response to 
the P A TCO strike reaffirms the federal government's commitment to enforcing 
current anti-strike legislation. At present there is no sign of a reverse trend. 
Although governmental policy towards public sector strikes in the two coun-
tries is vastly different, the actual strike practices in the two countries are more 
similar than official public policy differences would suggest. The United States 
policy of prohibiting public sector strikes is rooted in fears that such strikes 
would disrupt the sovereign governmental system and adversely affect the public 
interest. Canada does not share these fears, since many of its public employees 
have enjoyed a long history of collective bargaining rights. 
Canada has managed simultaneously to grant its employees collective bargain-
ing rights and to protect the public interest through the Public Service Staff 
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Relations Act. In allowing public employees to strike within statutory limits, and 
prohibiting designated employees from striking, the Act grants federal employ-
ees rights comparable to private employees, while still maintaining serVICes 
essential to the public. This result truly serves the public interest. 
Suzanne C. Lacampagne 
